Spandan Pattanayak

Pricing the bank's engine

JPMorgan's margin engine had only ever served JPMorgan. In 2022 new margin rules pulled mid-market hedge funds into scope, and most couldn't justify $2M to $4M to build their own. My MD gave me a blank sheet and twelve weeks to work out how to sell ours.

SIMM margin · example fundCalibration v2.6
Initial margin, after cross-class aggregation$48.2M
Interest rate$21.4M
Equity$13.9M
FX$8.1M
Credit$6.3M
Calculations this year41,300 of 50,000
Validation report attachedIllustrative figures
Role
Commercial lead: market sizing, pricing, business case and launch
Team
An engineering lead and two quant developers on scope; a four-person squad built it. Sales, Legal and Compliance signed off.
Time
12 weeks to funding, 18 clients by month 9
Built on
ISDA SIMM, CRIF files over a REST API, an Excel ROI model for Sales
$2M
contracted in year one8% over the base case
18
paying clientsfrom a three-client pilot
95%
renewedat the first renewal cycle
$112K
average contractagainst an $80K entry price

$2M is the sum of annual contract values at signing, reached by month 9. Revenue recognised in year one was about $1.6M because contracts started on different dates. The one client that didn't renew was bought by a fund with its own engine.

The problem

Who would actually pay

Phase 6 of the uncleared margin rules, in September 2022, brought funds with $8B to $50B in average notional into bilateral margin for the first time. Building a SIMM engine meant 12 to 18 months of work and quants on $300K salaries, plus a recalibration every year that nobody wanted to own.

Before calling a single fund, I interviewed 15 Sales coverage officers who managed those relationships. Their clients were getting by on spreadsheet approximations or paying consultants for one-off runs, and neither would satisfy a regulator for long.

I sized the market bottom-up. From the firms entering scope I removed anyone who already had an engine, then kept the regions where JPMorgan had Sales coverage. That left about 80 firms, worth $8.8M a year if every one signed.

Then Sales set up eight calls. I had a two-page concept brief and no product. Six funds wanted to pilot, and two put it in writing.

The map

Follow a client through

The commercial case, the product Engineering built and the sales motion, on one map. Pick a thread and step through it. Dotted pieces were deferred or scoped for later.

  • Built and shipped
  • Deferred or scoped next
  • Active in this step

Make the case · weeks 1 to 12

Sales interviews15 coverage officers
Bottom-up SAMAbout 80 firms
Prospect calls8 calls, 2 LOIs
Pricing model4 tested, hybrid chosen
Competitor benchmarkThree vendors
Business case3 scenarios, 60% stress
Service agreementCalculation only
Funding$500K approved

The product · scoped with Engineering, built by them

Client CRIF filePortfolio sensitivities
REST APIPer-client keys
Streaming APIDeferred
Input validatorCatches CRIF format errors
Tenant isolationEncrypted, separate schemas
CapacityPre-provisioned for peaks
SIMM engineJPMorgan's own
Calibration versionsOld and new side by side
Usage meter50,000 calcs included
Margin resultBy risk class
Reports, analyticsTiers 2 and 3
VaR as a serviceScoped next

Sell it · months 4 to 9

Sales introPrime Brokerage, Markets
Demo30 minutes
Proof of conceptTheir own file, 48 hours
Pilot$40K, 90 days
Annual contractTier plus allowance
Burst provisionFor a seasonal client
UpgradeTier 1 to Tier 2
Renewal95% renewed

OverviewFrom fifteen interviews to a funded product. Press play or step through.

Decisions

Calls I made

  1. $80K for the entry tier

    over the $60K Sales asked for

    Sales wanted the lowest price they could get, to close faster. At $60K, reaching $2M took 28 clients, 35% of the whole serviceable market in one year, and Sales agreed that wasn't happening. At $80K it took 20.

  2. Warm intros through Prime Brokerage

    over building a sales team for one product

    Sales already knew more than 60 of the 80 firms. Each deal went from an intro to a 30-minute demo to a proof of concept on the fund's own file. 18 of 21 real conversations ended in a contract.

  3. ISDA's CRIF format as the input

    over a schema of our own

    Every fund in scope could already produce CRIF files, so integration took about three weeks instead of months. It also made leaving us easy, and that made choosing us feel less risky.

  4. A calculation-only agreement

    over standing behind clients' regulatory filings

    Legal's question was who is liable if a client files a wrong number. JPMorgan provides the calculation and a validation report the client can attach. The filing stays the client's. Legal signed the third draft.

  5. Tier 1 and basic reporting in five months

    over Engineering's eight-month plan

    The extra three months were Tier 3 analytics. I moved them to a second phase, paid for by the first clients' revenue, and deferred the streaming API Engineering also wanted.

Try it

Setting the price

I treated this as two decisions. The model shapes how clients behave for years, and the level is one number you can revisit later. Pick each one and see where it lands against what funds were already being quoted.

1 · The model

Selected

2 · The entry price

Chosen

Pricing workbook · Risk-as-a-ServiceWeek 9
Per calculationRejected
Share of assets under managementRejected
Flat subscriptionConsidered
Annual license plus usageSelected
Annual price ranges: Cassini 100 to 300 thousand dollars, OpenGamma 50 to 150 thousand, Acadia 80 to 200 thousand. Our tiers at 80, 120 and 150 thousand. A marker shows the entry price selected. CassiniOpenGammaAcadia Our tiers T1T2T3 $0$100K$200K$300K $80K
Clients needed for $2M20 Share of the serviceable market25% In discovery callsChosen
Adoption

Who had to say yes

"We have the best SIMM engine on the Street. Figure out how to sell this."
My MD, on day one. There was no product and no pricing, and the Risk division had never sold anything outside the bank.
"We budgeted $1.5M to build this in-house. You saved us 18 months and $1.3M."
The COO of the quant fund in our pilot. Months earlier I had called him to explain a 45-minute outage.
Months 4–6

Pilot, three anchor clients

A $12B fund, a $9B quant fund and a fintech lender hedging its book, at $40K for 90 days. Integration averaged 3.2 weeks against a four-week target. The engine matched clients' own numbers 99.7% of the time, and the gap was CRIF formatting, so we added an input validator.

Month 6

Conversion

All three converted at full price, and two moved up to Tier 2 for the regulatory reports. Their savings, anonymised, went into the ROI calculator Sales used from then on.

Months 6–9

Scale to 18

Fifteen more clients in three months. By month 6 the average client ran 180 calculations a business day. The strategy document became the template for selling other internal risk tools.

Honest scope

What I'd change

Ideas from after JPMorgan. Not built there.

Next: pricing that rewards staying

The year-one model was built for adoption, and the usage threshold did its job: most clients never thought about the meter. It did nothing to lock in a second year or to reach funds below the $8B line.

Back to the pricing
  1. Commitment discounts

    List price for one year and 15 to 20% off for three. Year one needed flexibility. A second year needs predictable revenue and lower churn.

  2. A sandbox tier below $80K

    Around $15K a year with a small allowance, as a way in for smaller firms. We never priced for that long tail.

  3. Upgrade prompts from usage data

    We metered every call and never used the data to sell. A client running 180 calls a day could be shown exactly what Tier 2 would save on overages.

Known limits

  • Three of 18 clients made up 35% of revenue. I flagged it in a Q3 review instead of modelling it in the business case.
  • The 86% close rate came from warm intros during a regulatory deadline. Cold outreach would not have converted like that.
  • $80K was a year-one answer. The $100K that tested clean was left on purpose for later pricing.
  • Every contract assumed clients file their own numbers. That kept Legal comfortable and capped what we could promise.

Scoped, not built

  • VaR as a service, the next product on the same platform.
  • A streaming API for live trade updates, deferred from the first release.
  • A platform case of $8M to $12M a year by year three, which depended on that roadmap.

Next time

  • Size capacity on peak concurrent load. Our internal engine already showed four times average load at month-end.
  • Build concentration monitoring into the business case from day one.

Let's talk

Turning something built for internal use into a product people pay for? I'd like to hear about it.

pattanayakspandan@gmail.com